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Previous research has shown that calculating if something is to someone’s left or right
involves a simulative process recruiting representations of our own body in imagining
ourselves in the position of the other person (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010).We compared
left and right judgements from another’s spatial position (spatial perspective judgements)
to judgements of how a numeral appeared from another’s point of view (visual perspective
judgements). Experiment 1 conﬁrmed that these visual and spatial perspective judgements
involved a process of rotation as they became more difﬁcult with angular disparity
between the self and other. There was evidence of some difference between the two,
but both showed a linear pattern. Experiment 2 went a step further in showing that
these judgements used embodied self rotations, as their difﬁculty was also dependent
on the current position of the self within the world. This effect was signiﬁcantly stronger
in spatial perspective-taking, but was present in both cases. We conclude that embodied
self-rotations, through which we actively imagine ourselves assuming someone else’s
position in the world can subserve not only reasoning about where objects are in relation
to someone else but also how the objects in their environment appear to them.
Keywords: visual perspective-taking, spatial perspective-taking, embodied self rotation, theory of mind, level-2
perspective-taking, perspective-taking
INTRODUCTION
Human beings operate in complex social and spatial environ-
ments. In order to be successful, we must navigate our way
around this complex world, in which other people are partic-
ularly important. Cooperation and competition are thought to
have played a vital role in our evolution (Tomasello, 2008). In
order to cooperate with and compete against others we often need
to represent their perspectives. A minimal deﬁnition of a per-
spective is that it is someone’s relationship with objects and/or
other people in their environment (Surtees et al., 2013). A per-
spective can be related to the visual experiences of an individual;
famously in developmental psychology, Piaget and Inhelder (1956)
asked children to judge how the experimenter saw an array of
three mountains. Equally, a perspective can be related to the
spatial location of an object; work on frames of reference has
focused on people’s sensitivity to whether an object is located
above or below, or to the left or the right of someone (Carlson-
Radvansky and Jiang, 1998; Levinson, 1996). It is clear that a
mature system for visual perspective-taking at times necessitates
processing beyond the spatial relations between a person and the
objects within their environment. Take for example a woman who
hands her elderly husband his glasses to examine a passage in a
book that, while it looks perfectly clear to her, she knows will
appear blurry to him. In contrast to these special cases, how-
ever, there are a multitude of everyday social situations where
rapid decision-making about approximations to other people’s
visual experiences can be made simply on the basis of spatial
relations and orientations. In this paper, we build on recent
work comparing visual and spatial perspective-taking judgements
(Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010;
Michelon and Zacks, 2006; Surtees et al., 2013) and examine the
role for embodiment and rotation in visual and spatial perspective
judgements.
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Since Piaget’s early description of children as egocentric (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1956), a lot of focus has been placed on the age at
which children ﬁrst begin to understand that others do not share
their own view (Flavell et al., 1981) or a good view (Light and
Nix, 1983) of the world. Such judgements are thought to require
children to have a Theory of Mind (Hamilton et al., 2009), that
is to understand that other people are independent actors and
that their behavior is dependent upon their own mental states
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978) as well as the particular, current,
state of the world. Whilst much of the focus in the literature on
Theory of Mind has been on children’s ability to reason about
beliefs in general, and False Beliefs in particular (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983), successful reasoning based on the visual perceptions
of others similarly requires us to be sensitive to their mental states
and to overcome our own, egocentric biases (Surtees and Apperly,
2012).
Research with children and non-human animals suggests that
perspective-taking is not a unitary ability (Masangkay et al.,
1974; Flavell, 2000; Call and Tomasello, 2008). Flavell and
colleagues (Masangkay et al., 1974; Flavell et al., 1981) make a dis-
tinction between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking. Level-1
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perspective-taking requires understanding of what can be seen,
simply knowing which objects in the world are visually accessi-
ble to another person. Masangkay et al. (1974) showed children as
young as 3 to be able to successfully report that an adult could
see a dog pictured on the reverse of a card when they them-
selves saw a cat on its obverse. Children of this age were, however,
unable to report that a picture of a turtle on a ﬂat-lying card
would look upside down to the adult when it looked the right
way up to them. This latter task reﬂects level-2 perspective-taking,
judging how someone sees the world, speciﬁcally judging that a
single object can be represented differently by two different peo-
ple based on their viewpoint in the world. The emergence of
level-2 perspective-taking has been associated with other The-
ory of Mind developments that also occur around the age of
four (Perner, 1991), such as False Belief reasoning (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983), reasoning about the difference between appear-
ance and reality (Flavell et al., 1983). Similarly, a number of
other cognitive abilities signiﬁcantly progress at this age, such
as counterfactual thinking (Riggs et al., 1998), early reason-
ing about regret (Weisberg and Beck, 2010) and also executive
functioning (Espy, 1997; Kirkham et al., 2003). The distinction
between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking appears not to
be merely linked to children’s development, with many non-
human animals, such as chimpanzees (Tomasello et al., 2003),
goats (Kaminski et al., 2001), dogs (Hare and Tomasello, 2005)
andWestern Scrub-Jays (Emery and Clayton, 2004) showing level-
1, but as yet no evidence of level-2 abilities. Similarly, infants
(Song and Baillargeon, 2008) and adults (Samson et al., 2010)
seem to be spontaneously sensitive to whether or not someone
sees a given object, but again there is no such evidence for level-
2 perspective-taking (Surtees et al., 2012a). It is this convergence
of evidence that has led Apperly and Butterﬁll (2009) to suggest
that the distinction between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking
may demarcate a signature limit on efﬁcient theory of mind,
such that level-2 judgements are always demanding of cognitive
resources. In the current paper, we examine level-2 type judge-
ments. Speciﬁcally judgements of howanumeral looks to someone
else.
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
For Spatial perspective-taking here we mean the ability to under-
stand the spatial relationship between an individual and the objects
in their environment (sometimes spatial perspective-taking is
used to refer to mentally occupying another’s position in space;
Kessler and Wang, 2012). Unlike for visual perspectives, the con-
tent of Spatial perspectives is non-mental. A Spatial perspective is
solely and deﬁnitively prescribed by the exact spatial relationship
between a person and objects around them, rather than what they
think about those objects.Whilst wemay use our understanding of
how others perceive the world around them to inform our judge-
ments of where items are located in space relative to them, it is not
necessary to do so. A book may remain to the front and the left
of someone, regardless of whether they have perfect vision, suffer
from short-sightedness or are blind. Similarly, if someone were to
close their eyes, we should understand that they no longer have a
visual perspective on theworld, butmaintain their spatial perspec-
tive. For this reason, spatial perspectives are not necessarily linked
to individual people (Surtees et al., 2012b). A book can be located
to the front and left of a chair in the very way in which it can be
located to the front and the left of a person. Consequently, spa-
tial perspectives have been most commonly considered in terms
of frames of reference. A frame of reference is a set of axes upon
which to consider the location of objects (Levinson, 1996, 2003).
These axes can be absolute, deﬁned by an unchanging element of
the environment- Birmingham is located to the North of Brus-
sels, regardless of where we are. They can be relative, deﬁned by
the position of objects in relation to the viewer- you cannot see
the Manneken Pis if you stand on the Grand Place in Brussels
because the Hotel de Ville is in front of it. Or they can be intrinsic,
deﬁned by one of the objects we are reasoning about- I can move
the Palais Royal from being behind me to being in front of me by
the simple expedient of turning myself around. It is these intrinsic
frames of reference that incur spatial perspectives. Calculating an
intrinsic reference frame requires understanding the relationship
between an individual person or object and their environment.
Spatial frames of reference are calculated automatically follow-
ing the use of prepositions (Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang, 1998),
requiring inhibition to choose the most appropriate frame. Both
adults (Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1993) and children (Surtees
et al., 2012b) are known to be concurrently sensitive to multiple
frames of reference. Like for visual perspective-taking, there is evi-
dence that children do not necessarily use all aspects of a frame
of reference at the same age (Hands, 1972; Harris and Strom-
men, 1972; Cox, 1981; Bialystok and Codd, 1987). They show
a preference for the intrinsic frame of reference in early child-
hood and also learn the spatial referents “in front” and “behind”
(Harris and Strommen, 1972; Cox, 1981; Bialystok and Codd,
1987), before the referents “left of” and “right of” (Hands, 1972).
Interestingly, adults seem spontaneously sensitive to other peo-
ple’s spatial perspectives. Tversky and Hard (2009) found that
adults described objects as being to the left or right of a person
even though the task only asked them to describe the location of an
object.
PROCESSES FOR VISUAL AND SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Whilst much of the focus in the visual perspective-taking lit-
erature has been on the conceptual demands of understanding
other people’s minds, it is clearly of importance to understand the
cognitive architecture that allows us to represent others’ point of
view (Kessler et al., under review). Such processing must take into
account complex relationships between individuals and objects
within their spatial environment. Recently, a number of studies
have looked to identify the different processes for visuo-spatial
perspective-taking. Michelon and Zacks (2006) proposed 2 kinds
of visuo-spatial perspective-taking processes. The ﬁrst of these,
equivalent to level-1 visual perspective-taking, was used when
adults had to judge if an object could be seen or not. This process
was sensitive only to the distance between the target other and the
object about which the perspective was taken. It was concluded
that this process involved tracing the line of sight of the avatar. A
second process was sensitive to the angular disparity between the
participant and the other person in the scene and was used when
participants had to judge if a speciﬁed object was to the left or right
from the avatar’s position. This second process was concluded to
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require mental self rotation to align one’s own perspective with
that of another. Whilst the exact question was if the other saw the
object as on its left or right, it is clear that this second judgment
is primarily spatial in nature and equivalent to a purely spatial
judgment of whether the object was to the other’s left or right.
Michelon and Zacks’s (2006) ﬁndings are in line with previous
evidence of the effect of angular disparity on spatial judgements
(Huttenlocher andPresson,1973; Kozhevnikov andHegarty, 2001;
Keehner et al., 2006) and the identiﬁcation of both visuo-spatial
perspective-taking processes has since been replicated by Kessler
and colleagues (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thom-
son, 2010; Kessler and Wang, 2012). In a recent study, we (Surtees
et al., 2013) looked to further delineate these processes, and in
particular examined whether the differences found by Michelon
and Zacks (2006), Kessler and Thomson (2010) were primarily
caused by judgements being of a visual vs. spatial nature, or
whether they were primarily caused by judgements being of an
early developing kind or a later developing kind. We found that
spatial perspective judgements of an object as being in front of, or
behind, like visual perspective judgements of whether something
was visible, were not dependent on the angular disparity between
the self and other. The difﬁculty of visual judgements of how a
numeral appeared, on the other hand, like spatial judgements of
something as being to the left or to the right for someone, were
dependent on this angular disparity. We concluded that the selec-
tion of processing strategy was not determined by the nature of
the content, as mental or non-mental, but rather by the speciﬁc
task requirements and the degree to which simple features could
be used. A rotational mechanism seemed to be the default method
for only two kinds of judgements; level-2 visual perspective judge-
ments of how something appeared to someone else and spatial
judgements on the left to right dimension of an intrinsic frame of
reference.
EMBODIED SELF ROTATION VS. VIEWPOINT ROTATION
Difﬁculty based on angular disparity could be indicative of three
different types of rotational strategies. The ﬁrst is a mental self
rotation, which uses an embodied representation of the self that is
then rotated to the current bodily position of the target perspective
(Kessler et al., under review). Such a process uses motor represen-
tations to imagine transporting ourselves to another’s position
(Kessler and Thomson, 2010) and then simulates a self perspective
from that new position. The second is a mental object rotation,
throughwhichwe rotate theworld from the angle of the target per-
spective to our own current position (Kessler et al., under review).
Finally, the third is a mental viewpoint rotation (Kessler et al.,
under review), through which we use visuo-spatial cues to calcu-
late a viewpoint in a given position without occupying that point
of view in an embodied way. Only the ﬁrst of the three strategies
would require embodied self representations. Kessler and Thom-
son (2010) and Kessler and Rutherford (2010) used an innovative
method to investigatewhethermental self rotationwas used for left
and right judgements. Varying the angle of participants’ own bod-
ies in relation to the screen,whilst keeping headpositionﬁxed, they
reasoned, would only affect performance if mental self rotation
was employed. They found (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010) that
even though the visual impression remained the same (because
the head position was ﬁxed) across conditions, participants’ per-
formance varied as a function of their own body angle, with better
performance when their own body posture more closely matched
that of the avatar. They concluded from this that judging if an
object was to the left or the right of someone else involves an
embodied process of self rotation to align our perspective with
theirs. They found no impact of their body rotation manipulation
on judgements of whether an object was visible to the avatar or
not. This is perhaps not surprising as these judgements are not
affected by angle at all.
THE CURRENT STUDY
The aim of the current study was to test whether embodiment is
also used in visual perspective-taking. In the current study, we
adapted Kessler and colleagues’ (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010;
Kessler and Thomson, 2010) body posture manipulation to com-
pare its effect on two kinds of perspective-taking task. When
participants judged if an object was to an avatar’s left or right
(spatial perspective judgement), we predicted that they would use
embodied self rotation.We expected that their performancewould
be affected not only by the angle of disparity between the avatar’s
position and participants’ own position, but also by participants’
own body posture- with better performance when their own body
posture was more similar to that of the avatar (as found by Kessler
and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010). When partici-
pants judgedhowanumber looked to the avatar (visual perspective
judgement), we predicted that judgements would again be affected
by angular disparity (as found in Surtees et al., 2013). Our central
research question was whether this process was embodied or not.
If these judgements were also affected by body posture, it would
indicate a common embodied self rotation process implicated in
both visual and spatial perspective-taking. If these judgements
were independent of body posture consistency, this would sug-





Participants were 40 undergraduate students (11 male) from the
University catholique de Louvain, Belgium. They all participated
in the study in exchange of course credit or a small honorarium
of 8 Euros. Participants had an average age of 20.77 years (range
18–25). One participant was not included in the ﬁnal sample on
the basis of performing below chance.
Stimuli
In all of the pictures that participants saw, an avatar was placed
in the center of a featureless room (see Figure 1). The stimuli
were created using Blender (www.blender.org). The room also
contained a single cube, with a numeral written on its top-most
face (4, 6, 7 or 9). Within each stimulus, we varied two features
orthogonally. Angular disparity between the participant and the
avatar was varied through the positioning of the virtual camera
in relation to the avatar, creating angles of four different magni-
tudes: 0◦, 60◦, 120◦, 180◦. For angular disparity of both 60◦ and
120◦, separate stimuli were created showing the avatar in clockwise
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FIGURE 1 | Example stimuli from Experiment 1. Here all examples show anticlockwise rotation. An equal number of stimuli showed clockwise rotations. The
Visual perspective-taking condition also included stimuli in which the block/number was located behind the avatar.
and anticlockwise variants, crucial for evaluating our embodiment
hypothesis. We also varied distance, by placing the block at one
of two distances from the avatar: “Near” and “Far,” where the Far
condition was placed at a distance that was twice as far within the
virtual world as the Near condition. In the spatial condition, an
equal number of stimuli placed the block/number to the left and
to the right of the avatar, at an angle of 45◦ from the avatar and
always in front of him. In the visual condition, stimuli showed the
block/number to be directly in front, or directly behind the avatar.
Participants were randomly divided into two groups, Visual or
Spatial. Before the experiment, all participantswere given the same
basic information, that they would be performing a perspective-
taking task. Participants were sat in a rotating chair, with a red
rectangle attached to the ﬂoor at approximately 60◦ angle to their
right and a blue rectangle at approximately 60◦ to their left. They
placed their chin on a chin-rest (located 50 cm from the screen) on
every trial. After further instruction, giving example procedures
and the correct answer, all participants completed 16 practice tri-
als without rotation, 8 practice trials with rotation and ﬁnally
256 experimental trials divided into four blocks. All trials fol-
lowed the same basic procedure (see Figure 2). Participants were
ﬁrst of all cued with a picture showing a red or blue square with
a schematic illustration of a person (adapted from Kessler and
Thomson,2010). Participants had been instructed that the red pic-
ture meant they should rotate their body to the left/anticlockwise
and place their feet on the red rectangle on the ﬂoor, they were
instructed to keep the mouse on their lap (see Figure 3). The blue
picture conveyed the same instruction, but to the right/clockwise.
These rotations meant that participants’ own body orientation
varied from approximately 60◦ clockwise to approximately 60◦
anticlockwise in relation to the screen for every trial. Importantly,
though, by keeping their chins on the chin rest, participants’ visual
impression did not change (beyond the variations in the stimuli
type presented on the screen). Following the rotation cue, par-
ticipants saw a further screen, asking whether they had made the
rotation, this required amouse click to progress. The experimenter
observed a sample of these rotations and saw no cases in which
participants made errors in their rotations (this included at least
20 consecutive trials for each participant). Following this stimu-
lus, the standard trial sequence (Surtees et al., 2013) was presented
(Figure 2). A ﬁxation cross was followed by a cue (for spatial,
left or right; for visual, four, six, seven, or nine). This cue was
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FIGURE 2 | Basic procedure in Experiment 1. Participants veriﬁed whether a cue they saw matched a picture that followed. Note, on every trial, before these
slides, participants were cued to the rotation they had to make.
FIGURE 3 | Demonstration of Consistency effect. By turning anticlockwise,
pictures showing the avatar also rotated anticlockwise are Consistent and
those where the avatar has turned anticlockwise are Inconsistent. A
clockwise turn has the opposite effect. Note how the speciﬁc picture
stimulus, the direction of the turn and the visual impression for the participant
are independent of Consistency.
followed by the picture itself. In response to the picture, partici-
pants pressed the left mouse key to indicate that it matched the cue
and the right mouse key to indicate that it did not. Participants
received feedback during practice, but not during the experiment
itself.
For the Spatial condition, trials were equally and orthogo-
nally divided on four experimental factors. There were an equal
number of trials in which the cue did and did not match the
picture (Match/Mismatch). An equal number of trials of each
of the Angles (0◦, 60◦, 120◦, 180◦), of which the angles 60◦
and 120◦ were equally often clockwise or anticlockwise rotations.
An equal number of stimuli showed each Distance (Near, Far).
Finally, an equal number of trials required a left (red) or a right
(blue) rotation. Note, that our variable of particular interest- the
consistency between avatar and participant rotation- was varied
through a combination of Angle and Rotation. Consistent trials
occur with a left rotation of the participant and an anticlockwise
rotation of the avatar or with a right rotation of the participant
and a clockwise rotation of the avatar. This means that the fac-
tor Consistency was independent of stimulus and independent
of participant rotation. Stimuli were also varied on whether the
cue/object was left or right and whether the number was a 4, 6,
7 or 9.
For the Visual condition, trials were again equally divided
between Match and Mismatch trials. For Match trials, stimuli were
varied exactly as above, save for the fact that the block/number was
always directly in front of the avatar. For half of mismatch trials,
“number mismatch trials,” the same stimuli were presented, with
the block/number directly in front of the avatar, but the preceding
cue being a different number to that seen by the avatar in the pic-
ture. In the other half, “location mismatch trials,” the cue would
have been correct had the avatar been looking at the number, how-
ever, it was placed directly behind him. This manipulation meant
that participants had to take into account the avatar’s view and
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could not use the rotation of the number alone as a cue to the
correct answer.
In summary, the Visual and the Spatial conditions for Match
trials (those to be analyzed) were identical other than features
necessary for the speciﬁc judgements. Both conditions included
a range of angles from 0◦ to 180◦, to conﬁrm that rotation was
being used for the task at hand. By manipulating the position
of the participant in relation to the screen, and the positioning
of the avatar on the screen, we varied consistency between body
postures. This was independent of Angle, Distance, Rotation, Task
Content (Visual, Spatial), Number, Cue and Direction, so that any
inﬂuence could only be the result of the congruency between the
embodied state of the participant and the avatar (see Figure 3).
RESULTS
Only Match trials- those in which the cue matched the picture-
were included in the ﬁnal analysis. Outliers were excluded from
the analysis of response times on the basis of being more than 2.5
standard deviations away from the mean response time (2.9% for
visual, 2.7% for spatial), as were incorrect responses.
Our ﬁrst analyses investigated the effects of Angle and Distance
on perspective-taking. Particularly important here are the effects
of Angle and any interaction between Angle and Content. A lin-
ear effect of Angle would be representative of participants using
some form of rotation to complete the task. This analysis does not
investigate the embodied nature of the process.
A 4 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with Response Time as a dependent
variable, Angle (0◦, 60◦, 120◦, 180◦) and Distance (Near, Far) as
within subjects factors and content (Visual, Spatial) as a between
subjects factor revealed a main effect of distance, F(1, 38) = 10.46,
p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.216, with shorter avatar-object distances pro-
cessed more quickly1. There was also a main effect of Angle, F(3,
114) = 37.71, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.498, which represented a lin-
ear trend. There was also a main effect of content, with Visual
judgements being responded to more quickly, F(1, 38) = 12.89,
p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.253.
An interaction between Angle and Content, F(3, 114) = 7.43,
p= 0.004,ηp2 = 0.163, revealed a different relationshipwithAngle
for each Content. For both Visual, F(1, 19) = 41.36, p < 0.001,
and Spatial, F(1, 19) = 31.83, p < 0.001, perspective-taking
the relationship with Angle ﬁtted a linear trend. We investigated
this relationship further, by computing separate t-tests for adja-
cent angles for each content. For Spatial perspective-taking, the
strongest effect was for participants being slower at 120◦ than 60◦,
t(19) = 5.67, p < 0.001, with a less strong, but still signiﬁcant
effect of 180◦ being slower still t(19) = 5.67, p = 0.003. Though
responses at 0◦ were the slowest, these were not signiﬁcantly slower
than at 60◦, t(19) = 1.361, p = 0.190. Visual perspective judge-
ments showed a different pattern of performance (see Figure 4).
Here difference was greatest for judgements at 180◦ being slower
than at 120◦, t(19) = 4.75, p < 0.001. There was a trend for an
effect of faster judgements at 60◦ than 0◦, t(19) = 1.934, p = 0.068
and no signiﬁcant effect between 60◦ and 120◦, t(19) = 1.341,
p = 0.196, though again the larger angle produced a numerically
1In both experiments, all statistics are Greenhouse-Geisser corrected to guard
against violations of sphericity.
longer response time. The interaction between Distance and Con-
tent, F(1, 38) = 7.00, p = 0.012, ηp2 = 0.156, illustrated that
there was an effect of Distance on Visual, F(1, 19) = 20.85,
p< 0.001, ηp2 = 0.543, but not Spatial, F(1, 19) = 1.47, p = 0.705,
ηp2 = 0.008, judgements.
Error rates across conditions were generally low and did not
contradict the ﬁndings from response time (see Table 1).
Trials in which angular disparity was either 60◦ or 120◦ could
be either Consistent or Inconsistent on the basis of whether partic-
ipants have rotated their body to the left or to the right. Analysing
this subset of trialswithConsistency as an additional factor can test
the role of embodiment. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was completed with
Content as a between subjects factor and Consistency (Consistent,
Inconsistent) and Angle (60◦, 120◦) as within subjects factors. A
main effect of Angle, F(1, 38) = 25.55, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.402,
was moderated by an interaction betweenAngle and Content, F(1,
38) = 10.63, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.219. Over this smaller range of
angles, the effect was only signiﬁcant in the Spatial domain, F(1,
19) = 33.07, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.635, not the Visual domain, F(3,
19) = 1.69, p = 0.210, ηp2 = 0.081. There was no signiﬁcant effect
of Consistency, F(1, 38) = 1.30, p = 0.261, ηp2 = 0.033, but there
was a trend for an interaction between Consistency and Content,
F(1, 38) = 3.63, p = 0.064, ηp2 = 0.087. This illustrated a trend
for Consistent trials being easier than Inconsistent, but only in the
Spatial condition, F(1, 19) = 3.041, p = 0.097, ηp2 = 0.138 (see
Figure 4).
In Experiment 1, Visual perspective-taking, but not spatial
perspective-taking showed an effect of distance. This was surpris-
ing and had not been evidenced in our previous study (Surtees
et al., 2013), in which we found a signiﬁcant effect of distance
that did not differ across conditions. One possibility is that having
fewer conditions here (two rather than four) has given a greater
power to identify a difference. This is supported by the fact that in
the spatial condition of Surtees et al. (2013), at two angles (0◦ and
120◦), judgements at shorter distances were actually more difﬁ-
cult than at longer distances. This was never the case in the visual
condition, where further distance always conferred greater difﬁ-
culty. Both Visual and Spatial perspective-taking showed a strong
and linear effect of angular disparity between the participant and
the avatar on the screen in front of them, replicating the ﬁnd-
ings of Surtees et al. (2013) and suggesting a rotational process
was employed. That is not to say, however, that this relationship
was identical. For Spatial perspective-taking, the strongest effect
was between the two mid-range angles, 60◦ and 120◦. For Visual
perspective-taking, this difference was not signiﬁcant, instead it
was the difference between 120◦ and 180◦ that was most strongly
signiﬁcant. This is in some ways surprising, as this difference was
not found by Surtees et al. (2013) who used the very same stimuli.
One possibility is that the physical rotations (regardless of direc-
tion) had a different effect on the rotational processes of Visual
and Spatial perspective. Specifying exactly how is very speculative
at this stage, but one possibility is that for Spatial perspective tak-
ing, the 60◦ condition was made artiﬁcially easy because here the
character’s basic body posture matched the participant’s.
Experiment 1 also showed a trend for an interaction between
Consistency and Content suggesting that visual and spatial
perspective-taking may be embodied to a different degree. Spatial
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FIGURE 4 | Both visual (right) and spatial (left) perspective-taking
showed a significant, linear effect of angle. In spatial perspective
judgements there was a trend for participants performing better if their own
body posture was consistent with that of the avatar, in the visual condition,
there was no such trend. Error bars show within-subjects standard error of
the mean.
Table 1 | Percentage error rates (standard deviations) from Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1
0◦ 60◦ 120◦ 180◦ Consistent Inconsistent
Spatial 5 (5) 3.59 (4) 4.84 (5) 7.34 (7) 4.34 (5) 4.06 (4)
Visual 1.87 (3) 3.75 (5) 1.41 (3) 3.28 (3) 2.03 (3) 3.13 (4)
Experiment 2
120◦ Consistent 120◦ Inconsistent 150◦ Consistent 150◦ Inconsistent
Spatial 3.65 (4) 7.03 (9) 2.60 (3) 5.99 (7)
Visual 3.65 (5) 5.99 (5) 3.13 (3) 3.65 (6)
perspective-taking showed a trend for an effect of Consistency.
Participants trended toward performing better when their own
position was aligned with that of the avatar. From this, we ten-
tatively concluded that spatial perspective-taking recruited an
embodied self rotation process, while visual perspective-taking
recruited a (non-embodied) viewpoint rotation process. How-
ever, as the trends were non-signiﬁcant, it also remains possible
that our test was insensitive to differing embodied effects (for
we should expect an effect of body posture consistency at least
in the spatial condition to replicate the ﬁndings of Kessler and
Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010). Also, our ﬁrst
experiment investigates one speciﬁc circumstance when we have
to conﬁrm a pre-deﬁned proposition for the other’s perspective
(our task required a veriﬁcation, yes/no, judgement). It is possible
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FIGURE 5 | Results of Experiment 2. Error bars show within-subjects standard error of the mean. The effect of Consistency is greater for Spatial
perspective-taking. There was no interaction between Angle and Consistency.
that actively calculating another person’s perspective uses embodi-
ment to a different degree. In Experiment 2, we addressed both the
concern over lack of sensitivity and over perspective conﬁrmation
vs. calculation by using a forced choice methodology. As well as
removing the veriﬁcation aspect of the procedure, this method has
the advantage of increasing the power (as all responses are permis-
sible in the ﬁnal analysis). Also to increase power, we removed the
stimuli showing the avatar at 0◦ and 180◦ (as these only tested for
rotation, not embodiment per se) and tested only at angles higher
than 90◦, those which previous studies have found to show clear-





Participants were 32 undergraduate students (9 male) from the
University catholique de Louvain, Belgium. They all participated
in the study in exchange for a small honorarium of 8 Euros.
Participants had an average age of 21.93 years (range 18–26).
Design and procedure
The design of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment
1, other than the following details. Instead of making responses to
a preceding cue, here participants made a forced choice response.
For Spatial perspective-taking, this meant pressing the left but-
ton on the mouse when the number was located to the left of
the avatar and the right when it was to his right (note here
that effects of spatial compatibility, Simon, 1969, were controlled
across body posture consistency). For Visual perspective-taking,
it meant pressing the left button when the number the avatar
saw was a number six and the right when he saw a number
nine. In this case, only stimuli where the avatar saw a six or nine
were included and they were always placed in front of him (and
displaced to the left or right in the spatial condition). After com-
pleting 24 practice trials (as in Experiment 1, 16 with the task
alone, 8 with rotation), participants completed 96 experiment tri-
als. Fewer trials were needed here as all trials were included in
the ﬁnal analysis (the analysis of Consistency has more power).
New stimuli were created that had the avatar placed at either
120◦ or 150◦ angle from the participant. Again, participants were
cued before each trial to rotate to the left or right, again plac-
ing their feet on the mat at an angle of approximately 60◦ to the
screen.
RESULTS
Again, trials in which participants made incorrect responses were
excluded (see Table 1), as were trials in which response time was
more than 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean (3.2% for
visual, 3.1% for spatial).
A 2× 2× 2ANOVAwithContent (Visual, Spatial) as a between
subjects factor, and Angle (120◦, 150◦) and Consistency (Consis-
tent, Inconsistent) as within subjects factors revealed an effect of
Angle, F(1, 30) = 19.88, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.399, 120◦ < 150◦
(Figure 5). This effect was moderated by an interaction with
Content, F(1, 30) = 14.20, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.321, showing
the effect of Angle was signiﬁcant for Spatial judgements, F(1,
15) = 18.95, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.558, but not for Visual judge-
ments, F(1, 15) = 1.11, p = 0.308, ηp2 = 0.069. There was no
interaction betweenAngle and Consistency, or Angle, Consistency
and Content, Fs < 1.10, ps > 0.307, ηp2 < 0.035.
Crucially, there was an effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 25.84,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.463. This was moderated by a signiﬁ-
cant interaction, with Content, F(1, 30) = 11.42, p = 0.002,
ηp2 = 0.276. Investigating this interaction showed that while the
size of this effect was numerically greater in the spatial condition,
F(1, 15) = 18.79, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.566, it was also signiﬁcant
in the Visual condition, F(1, 15) = 15.31, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.505.
As in Experiment 1, there was also an effect of Content, F(1,
30) = 9.79, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.246, such that Visual perspectives
were processed more quickly.
DISCUSSION
Across two experiments, we investigated the degree to which
perspective-taking required mental rotation and the degree to
which that rotation was embodied. We tested this for two very
different kinds of perspective-taking. We found further evidence
that an explicitly spatial task recruited mental rotation. When par-
ticipants judged whether an object was to the left or the right of
an avatar it became increasingly more difﬁcult as the angle of the
avatar’s body became increasingly more different from the partic-
ipant’s position. In addition to this, we found evidence that this
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rotational process was an embodied self rotation, as has previ-
ously been shown by Kessler and Thomson (2010), and Kessler
and Rutherford (2010). Participants found it easier (statistical
trend in Experiment 1 and signiﬁcant effect in Experiment 2)
to make spatial judgements when their own body posture more
closely matched that of the avatar- even though this was manip-
ulated independently of the visual impression of the scene. When
participants completed a visual perspective-taking task, we also
found evidence of rotation. Experiment 1 showed that it is harder
to judge how a number appeared to an avatar whose angular
viewpoint differed from one’s own to a greater degree. Perhaps
most surprisingly, in Experiment 2, we showed that this process
could also involve an embodied self rotation. In sum, ﬁndings for
spatial perspective-taking suggested consistent use of embodied
mental self rotation. For visual perspective-taking we evidenced
the same process, but the strength of the effect was neither as
strong nor as consistent as for spatial perspective-taking. The
embodiment of this process was only evidenced in Experiment
2 and even here was not as strongly signiﬁcant as for spatial
perspective-taking.
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Judging how a numeral looks to someone else who does not view
it from the same angle as us is a clear example of level-2 visual
perspective-taking, knowing that a single object can make a dif-
ferent visual impression on two people who view it from different
angles (Flavell et al., 1981). This process is known to be difﬁcult
both for children (Masangkay et al., 1974) and for adults (Sur-
tees et al., 2012a). Developmentalists have tended to focus on the
conceptual difﬁculties posed by holding two conﬂicting relation-
ships on a single object (Perner, 1991) or on the demands in
inhibiting a salient self perspective (Surtees et al., 2012a). Here
we present evidence that one source of difﬁculty in these tasks is
rotation. Whilst it is clear that in Flavell’s classic “turtle” task we
have to understand that another person can represent the same
turtle differently and inhibit a salient self-view of a turtle hap-
pily upstanding or disarmingly prostrate, we also need to mentally
align how we see the world with how it is seen by the person
with whom we are interacting. We replicate ﬁndings from our
previous study (Surtees et al., 2013) that level-2 visual perspec-
tive judgements become more difﬁcult as our angle becomes more
different from that of the person whose perspective we take. In
Experiment 1, we showed a linear effect of Angle on speed of
responses.
Kessler and Rutherford (2010), Kessler and Thomson (2010)
showed that judging that one object was on the left or the right
from someone else’s point of view was affected by the partici-
pant’s current body angle in the world. Here we show that the
same applies to judgements of visual perspectives. In Experiment
2, participants’ own body angle affected their ability to judge if a
number looked like a six or a nine to an avatar on the screen. This
is the ﬁrst ﬁnding showing that a judgment of a purely mental
state can also require us to align our bodies with that of some-
one else in the world. This suggests that, at least in some cases,
to think of how someone else sees the world requires us really
“putting ourselves into their shoes.” The effect of body posture
consistency was however only signiﬁcant in Experiment 2 and not
in Experiment 1. There are two possible explanations to account
for these discrepant results. One possibility is that Experiment 1
simply was not sensitive enough to demonstrate this effect. A sec-
ond possibility is that the difference reﬂects the employment of
different processes determined by surface demands of the situa-
tion. Experiment 1, in which participants have to hold in mind a
cue (e.g., “nine” meaning that they have to verify if the object
looked like a 9 to the avatar), may promote a different strat-
egy from Experiment 2 in which participants’ judgements are
solely based on the picture stimulus (here participants have to
decide whether the object looks like a “6” or a “9” to the avatar
when presented with the picture). In Experiment 1, participants
could have used the cue to create a mental image of an expected
stimulus and then used a geometrical comparison between this
and the ﬁnal picture. This would result in the observed effect of
angle and the absence of effect of body posture consistency. In
Experiment 2, on the other hand, the effect of body posture con-
sistency seems to rule out that such geometrical comparison was
used consistently across trials and participants. It is also possible
that some participants used conditional rules to calculate visual
perspectives (e.g., If he faces toward me then he does not see
the same number as me), but our signiﬁcant ﬁndings, of angu-
lar disparity in Experiment 1 and embodiment in Experiment
2 suggest this was not widely applied. We propose that level-
2 visual perspective-taking requires ﬂexible processing (Apperly
and Butterﬁll, 2009) and its challenges may be met in a num-
ber of ways (Kessler et al, under review), and may be dependent
on the precise requirements of a problem and even individual
differences (Kessler and Wang, 2012). Further studies may look
to experimentally manipulate strategy use through systematically
priming the use of conditional rules, geometrical comparison and
embodied self rotation or through using a dual-task situation to
occupy resources for language, imagined spatial manipulation or
proprioception.
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Evidence that we use spatial alignments of perspectives to cal-
culate the perceptions of others suggests perspective-taking is
reliant on an understanding of the relationships between peo-
ple and objects in space. There are, of course, many judgements
that explicitly require us to use such relationships, with no pre-
text of mental state use whatsoever. When I ask a colleague to
pass the coffee cup that’s to her left, I’m using my understand-
ing of her intrinsic frame of reference- her spatial perspective.
Interestingly, some cultures do not use these spatial perspectives
for these kinds of judgements, preferring the absolute reference
frame- pass the cup that is nearer to the river than you are (Levin-
son, 1996; Bowerman and Choi, 2003). We show, here and across
two experiments, that these judgements that something is to some-
one’s left or right require embodied self rotation. Like judgements
of how a numeral looks, they are sensitive to both the angular
disparity between us and the person whose perspective we take
and to the consistency of our current body position (replicat-
ing the ﬁndings of Kessler and Thomson, 2010; and Kessler and
Rutherford, 2010). It seems that to judge that a coffee cup is to
someone’s right involves us imagining that we are where they
are and then judging if the coffee cup would be to our left our
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right. Quite noticeably, the effects of angular disparity and body
posture consistency were stronger in the spatial than visual per-
spective judgment conditions, suggesting that the use of embodied
self mental rotation was a strategy more widely used across trials
and participants. One possibility is that this is the result of us
using our own body representations as a cue to remember the
locations of left and right (in England and in Belgium, for exam-
ple, a common strategy is to remind school children that your
“right is the one you write with”). An interesting further ques-
tion addresses whether such judgements of spatial perspectives
are principally for or exclusive to reasoning about human oth-
ers. There is good evidence that human and non-human spatial
transformation do not necessarily use the same cognitive (Zacks
et al., 2000) or neural (Zacks and Michelon, 2005) processes. On
the other hand, no studies have examined the processes used for
locating objects relative to other people or other objects (rather
they have focused on identifying the left or right arm of a person
vs. the left or right side that a handle of a cup is on). Similarly,
we may predict a role for strategy (Kessler and Wang, 2012) and
for speciﬁc expertise- such as a tennis fan who can quickly judge
a ball as being to Novak Djokovic’s forehand (right) side or Rafael
Nadal’s forehand (left) side or a naval ofﬁcer who can quickly con-
clude that a shoal of dolphins is to the port (left) of the HMS Ark
Royal.
COMPARING VISUAL AND SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Similarities. On the basis of the ﬁndings of Experiment 2 in which
body posture consistency effects were found on both types of
perspective-taking judgements, we have concluded that both Spa-
tial perspective judgements of an object as being to the left or right
of someone and visual perspective judgements of how something
looks to them recruit processes including embodied self rotation.
Under tightly controlled experimental conditions, in which par-
ticipants take another’s perspective on multiple occasions, both
sets of judgment are sensitive to the angular disparity between the
target other person and the self viewpoint and to the current ori-
entation of the self body. We suggest that an important step for
each problem is to imagine ourselves in the position of the other.
Differences. It is clear that further processing beyond an
embodied rotation is required to solve these problems and that
this processing necessarily differs for each task. Mature visual
perspective-taking must take into account individual characteris-
tics of their target: blindfolds, blurred vision or a lack of attention
can signiﬁcantly change how we judge another’s visual perspective
in a way that is not required for spatial perspective-taking. These
extra demands of visual perspective-taking may be in part respon-
sible for the fact that our embodiment effect was less reliable for
visual than for spatial perspective-taking. In Experiment 1, there
was no evidence of an effect of consistency of body posture for
visual perspective-taking and the effect in Experiment 2was signif-
icantly stronger for spatial perspective-taking. We follow Kessler
and Wang (2012) in promoting the idea that in these effortful
perspective-taking tasks strategies may differ between individu-
als and on the basis of speciﬁc task demands. Our experiments
suggest that variable strategy use was more prevalent for visual
than for spatial perspective-taking. We also found evidence that
spatial perspective-taking was substantially more difﬁcult than
visual perspective-taking in both experiments. We believe the
most parsimonious explanation of this is that we use embodied
self rotation and then simulate the perspective from that posi-
tion. As judging objects as being to one’s own left or right is likely
to be more difﬁcult than judging how a number looks (a sim-
ple, automatized reading process) this would explain the overall
difference.
Visual and spatial perspective-taking also differed in the nature
of their relationship withAngle. We concluded that both processes
required rotation, based on their linear relationship with Angle in
Experiment 1. There was, however an interaction between Angle
and Content. Following up this interaction showed that the pre-
cise pattern of added difﬁculty gained with increasing angle was
not identical between the two kinds of perspective-taking. Most
notably,while the difﬁculty of taking spatial perspectives grewmost
substantially between 60◦ and 120◦, for visual perspective-taking,
this comparison did not reach signiﬁcance. Similarly, while Exper-
iment 2 showed a robust effect of Angle in spatial perspective-
taking, this was not the case in visual perspective-taking. These
ﬁndings differ somewhat from the ﬁndings of Surtees et al. (2013),
in which we used a similar method without the physical act of
rotating the body, although importantly, both studies show a basic
linear relationship between angular disparity and the difﬁculty
of visual perspective-taking. We suggest that this rotation may
have made some difference to both the exact nature of processing
difﬁculty at different angles and to the variability in responses.
Exactly explaining these speciﬁc differences may require further
study, but the matter of key importance is that minor exper-
imental changes affected spatial and visual perspective-taking
differently, further suggesting that though they adopt similar pro-
cesses, there are still clear differences in the instantiation of these
processes.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF VISUAL AND SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Identiﬁcation of similar strategies for spatial judgements of
left/right and visual judgements of how something looks to
someone else is consistent with the developmental proﬁle of
these abilities. The ability to make left/right judgements (Hands,
1972) develops after the ability to make front/back judgements
(Harris and Strommen, 1972; Cox, 1981; Bialystok and Codd,
1987). Similarly, judgements of how something looks (level-
2 visual perspective-taking) are achieved after judgements of
whether or not someone can see something (Flavell et al., 1981;
Moll and Tomasello, 2006; Moll and Meltzoff, 2011). Our cur-
rent ﬁndings imply one possible explanation for this. That the
most common and robust method for achieving both of these
processes requires embodied mental self rotation, suggests that
it may be difﬁculties with this embodied rotation, rather than
with perspective-taking per se that is evidenced in developmental
studies. There is much debate and conﬂicting evidence regarding
children’s abilities in object rotation (Perrucci et al., 2008), even
after the age they pass standard perspective-taking tasks. To our
knowledge, however, there has been no systematic investigation of
their abilities at mental self rotation.
That success on level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks may
be dependent on embodied self-rotation allows for one of two
broad alternative explanations. Firstly, children may have the basic
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conceptual apparatus to succeed in level-2 perspective-taking sit-
uations, even before they pass, but this conceptual knowledge may
be obscured by lacking the domain general ability to imagine rotat-
ing their position in the world. This alternative is supported by
ﬁndings of precocious performance on a level-2 type task employ-
ing color ﬁlters with 3-year olds (Moll and Meltzoff, 2011), rather
than angular differences in perspective. Secondly, embodied self
rotation may play a causal role in children learning the abstract,
non-spatial notion of perspective. This idea, that increased pro-
cessing ﬂexibility may play a crucial role in children’s development
of complex concepts, has been suggested by Russell (1996) in rela-
tion to children’s agency helping them to learn about the world.
Investigation of the relative development of rotation and effortful
perspective-taking should tell us whether rotation is necessary for
learning perspective concepts, necessary for achieving perspec-
tive transformations in young children or co-opted once adults
have developed a range of perspective-taking strategies and have
substantial executive resources.
CONCLUSION
When we interact in complex social environments we undertake
complex visuo-spatial reasoning which may or may not involve
thinking about the mental states of other people. Taxing judge-
ments of how the world appears to someone else and what things
are located to the left or the right of them seem to involve a compa-
rable process of embodied self rotation. We imagine ourselves in
the position of a target other. To do this we take as a starting point
the current position of our own body as well as the visual input
of a scene in front of us. Embodied perspective-taking processes
are robust processes effective in generating visual perspectives of
anyone whose basic perceptual apparatus is the same as ours and
generating spatial perspectives of anyone who shares our basic
anatomy. That is not to say that these processes are the same in toto,
but rather that they share common processing features and strat-
egy use. These processes are relatively costly and solve problems
that are beyond the abilities of very young children. Further stud-
ies may look to consider what in these processes responds solely to
target humanothers (as opposed to objects), howwedeal with spe-
cial cases in which other’s perceptual access is compromised and
how experts overcome the costly nature of this perspective-taking
process.
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